Commentary: Russia-Ukraine Conflict Viewed Through the Lens of the Changing World Order
There can be no justification for the human suffering that has been unleashed on Ukraine by Putin. The invasion disregards all international conventions and the rule of law. The atrocities must be condemned unequivocally. But beyond condemnation, what would work and what would not?
As Ukraine resists a sustained onslaught by Russian transgression, the world is shocked by the brutality of the attack. The toll on civilians, displacement of nearly a million people, and the carnage of bombs have pained people across the globe. Yet, the world at large remains lost about how the situation can be controlled.
To fully understand the crisis and to evolve effective policy, it is important to examine the event from the lens of the changing world order. First, starting from the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has increasingly been uneasy about the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of the European Union (EU), as also of the weakening of the Warsaw Pact. These, together with the spread of democracy into the former Communist nations of Eastern Europe, have threatened Russia, which has increasingly felt a loss of pride and power. Putin’s aggressive actions on Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine probably stem from this mindset of paranoia and fear. Against this context of distrust and fear, it is difficult to engage Putin in any meaningful negotiations.
Second, the best instrument for international negotiations and peace that we have, the United Nations (UN), has been losing credibility. Established in the aftermath of World War II, the UN largely reflects the power structure and priorities of that time, and still vests disproportionate powers—including veto powers—in the hands of five countries: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China. Furthermore, over the seventy-seven years of its existence, the agency’s policies have been driven largely by the interests and values of western Europe and the United States. The UN has also failed to be consistent in its condemnation of transgressions of international law and human rights, favoring powerful nations such as the United States, while being unduly harsh toward others that are in opposition to the western nations.
This perception of the UN as an agency dominated by Western Europe and its allies has impaired its ability to act effectively. Even in the recent vote condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, countries representing the majority of the world population—China and India and others—either abstained or stood behind Russia.
Third, the world is changing rapidly in terms of economic, military, and cultural powers. The rapid growth across the low-and middle-income countries (LMIC)—nations that had been gated out of the industrial revolution during the 19th and 20th centuries—has begun to change the global landscape. This is altering the global dynamics of power, with the two most populated countries of the world, China and India, rapidly ascending in influence. China is already a leading economy and military power; and India, though some years behind China, is also on that trajectory. So are many other Asian nations. This means the rise of Asia as an important region of the world in terms of global strategies.
Simultaneously, several other LMICs in Africa and Latin America are also experiencing rapid economic development. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the emerging markets (e.g., China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Mexico) will dominate the world’s top ten economies by 2050. China, India, and the U.S., in that order, will be the leading economies, and there will be a relative decline of the Western European economies (e.g., Germany, Britain, France). These changes, together with the decrease of the unipolar power, influence, and credibility of the United States, mean that the configuration of the new world order will look very different.
With this context in mind, here are some short- and long-term predictions for how the Russia-Ukraine conflict may play out, and how crises, such as these, may accelerate changes to the world order and collective governance.
Short-term
In the immediate short-term, we may anticipate the following four things.
Putin is likely not going to occupy Ukraine as he will not want to repeat the mistakes of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, or that of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. He will, instead, take over Pro-Russia parts, encircle Ukraine, and plant a pro-Russia government—similar to how he handled Georgia.
Second, western European nations and the United States are furiously putting major sanctions against Russia. This is understandable. However, these sanctions will take time to have an effect, and even then, may only have minimal effect on Russia, while simultaneously weakening the western European economies. Taking strategic advantage of this situation, there are already signs that China, the Gulf countries, Iran, Pakistan, India will get around the sanctions diplomatically and make deals with Russia.
Third, afraid that Putin may take his invasion spree into other nations with the possible goal of reintegrating the lost Soviet empire, western Europe will increase defense expense and NATO will get more armed. Germany has already announced an increase to its defense budget, a major move for the first time after WWII. Other European nations are following suit. The United States and NATO will undoubtedly get more armed with the perception of the Russian threat.
Fourth, China and India will try to broker peace and may slowly gain traction. They have already indicated this by abstaining from the vote against Russia in the UN Security Council. Israel and UAE will also gain traction as peace brokers, and even as we speak, Israel is in conversation with Russia and Ukraine, apparently trying to halt the war. As Christiane Amanpour of CNN reported after talking to the President of Ukraine, the countries with any leverage to influence Putin now are China, India, Israel, UAE; and this is only possible as these nations have shown neutrality.
Long-term
It is always hard to forecast the long-term, but we will likely see the following patterns emerge over the next 3-15 years.
Russia may have troubles from within due to its economic challenges, and a change in leadership may eventually happen. Given the changing global landscape, Russia’s economic woes, and its irresponsible wars, Russia is bound to weaken in the long run and lose much of its influence on the global stage.
Ukraine will likely stay out of NATO and be neutral or Russia-leaning. Whether this will be through a treaty with Russia or through a pro-Russian government is unclear. There is also the likelihood of Ukraine being a restless state with fragmented internal politics and periodic violence.
Western European influence will weaken due to an aging population, slow economic growth, and increased defense expenditure. The U.S. economy will stay fine as it is big and also practical. In realigning with the new world dynamics, it will shift its strategic interests increasingly toward Asia (with strong ties with Australia, Japan, and India as part of the QUAD), while gradually shifting attention away from Europe. However, the influence and power of the United States will gradually decrease, and the country will reconfigure itself in greater trade and strategic alignment with the rising powers, including China and India.
China’s economy and influence will grow. While the U.S. and western Europe fear that China may get aggressive and start conflicts with Taiwan or in the Indo-Pacific, it is unlikely that China will do anything that will jeopardize its economy or global influence. An examination of China’s long history indicates that an underlying doctrine that drives its foreign policy is based on the ancient treatise of “Art of War” by Sun Tzu; and is a composite approach of multiple skills and strategies but largely focuses on winning without actually going to war.
India will realign interests carefully and position itself into the future by balancing relationships across all powers. In the past 30 years, India has begun to modernize its economy and build stronger ties with the United States and western Europe, Israel, and Japan. It does so while also keeping close ties with Russia and Iran. The country also has a “look east” policy and is building ties with several Asian nations. It is simultaneously strengthening its ties with the middle eastern and African countries. The India-China relationship displays features of long-term cooperation, while some thorny issues remain. Notably, in their 5000-year history, the two countries have fought one brief war lasting days. It is, therefore, unlikely, that any of their disagreements will spill over into major conflicts. India’s strategic lens is largely based on peaceful coexistence but with self-interest in mind.
In summary, while it is natural to view the Russia-Ukraine conflict in isolation, it is important to understand the larger and more complex geopolitical changes the world is going through. What is becoming clear is that the instruments for multilateral engagement and global peace that were put in place in the aftermath of WWII need serious revision to reflect the changing power dynamics. By 2040, China, India, and the U.S. will be the big forces, along with several LMIC nations; and new models of respectful multilateral cooperation among them will be needed. Furthermore, multilateral instruments, such as the UN, will need revision to reflect the positions and preferences of the changed power dynamics to be effective in maintaining global peace.
K. M. Venkat Narayan, M.D., is the Executive Director of Emory Global Diabetes Research Center, and Professor of Global Health, Medicine, & Epidemiology at Emory University. He is a consummate commentator on current events and issues.
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